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EDWARD B. FOLEY*
In a scholar's career, few accomplishments are as rewarding as when
another scholar, especially a longstanding leader in the field, gives one's
work the kind of sustained and thoughtful treatment that Dan Lowenstein has
devoted to my taxonomy of potential Bush v. Gore claims. I am particularly
appreciative of the charitable way in which he describes my work, and I feel
fortunate that I can respond in kind because I agree that he has usefully
suggested an alternative to the taxonomy I proposed. Considering his
suggestions has caused me to modify my original proposal, incorporating a
key analytic distinction he advances, while at the same time refining features
that he would have replaced. In doing so, I hope that this Response reflects
the ideals of academic inquiry in general, as well as of this Symposium
specifically: dialogue between scholars and building on one another's
insights can advance public understanding of difficult issues in ways that the
isolated pursuits of solitary scholars cannot.1
I. PRELIMINARY POINTS OF AGREEMENT
To the extent that Lowenstein and I ultimately disagree, I surmise that
the scope of disagreement is much narrower than perhaps he believes. For
example, he devotes much of his article in this Issue to refuting what he calls
a "Janus interpretation" of Bush v. Gore,2 which he describes as one that
accentuates (rather than attempts to resolve) the apparent tension between its
limiting language and its more expansive Equal Protection rhetoric.
Lowenstein is particularly disdainful of those who have claimed that the
limiting language was intentionally designed to prevent the decision from
having precedential effect. Although in places Lowenstein groups me with
others who have made this claim, I had hoped my article was clear in
indicating just the contrary. Like Lowenstein, I believe that others are both
incorrect and disrespectful insofar as they assert that the Bush v. Gore
majority intended a single-ticket decision, "good for this day and train
* Director, Election Law @ Moritz, & Robert M. Duncan/Jones Day Designated
Professor of Law.
I I am also deeply appreciative of the generally sympathetic reading of my initial
article by John Fortier in this Issue of the Ohio State Law Journal. See John Fortier,
Foley on the Future of Bush v. Gore, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1051 (2007). Because Fortier does
not offer an alternative taxonomy to the one I initially presented, his paper does not
require the extended response that Lowenstein's article warrants.
2 Daniel H. Lowenstein, The Meaning of Bush v. Gore, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1007, 1017
(2007).
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only." 3 For example, in my original article, I described the Court's limiting
language as its "most-mocked sentence. . . -and unfairly so."'4 I specifically
said that this limiting language was "not an avowal of an unprincipled power
grab, but most likely just a caution that the Court's holding may not be as
broad as some might wish or think" (a description that accords precisely with
Lowenstein's own reading of it). 5
Lowenstein also devotes much energy to arguing that a proper
understanding of the holding in Bush v. Gore requires a recognition that this
holding applies only in the context of judicially-supervised statewide
recounts. I am not prepared to disagree with Lowenstein on this point,
especially given his carefully circumscribed definition of a case's holding as
distinct from the case's precedential force. Lowenstein defines the holding of
a decision as the reasoning that determines which future cases are "on all
fours" with the decision and thus directly controlled by it.6 Lowenstein
crucially acknowledges that a decision, by virtue of its "analogical influence"
on similar-although not identical-cases, may have considerable
precedential force well beyond the scope of the narrow set of cases that it
directly controls. 7 As a result, there is no need here to quibble whether the
holding of Bush v. Gore is properly understood as being confined to the
category of judicially-supervised statewide recounts.
Moreover, before moving on to the range of potential future cases in
which Bush v. Gore has precedential force (which both Lowenstein and I
agree is what counts for taxonomical purposes), I observe briefly that Bush v.
Gore has significant potential impact even within the narrow scope of its
holding as articulated by Lowenstein. One of the initial objectives motivating
my taxonomy project was to show that Bush v. Gore was not just a "hanging
chad" case, but, rather, that it had applicability to other cases of differential
treatment concerning the casting and counting of ballots. As my original
article describes, and as Lowenstein agrees, it is easy to imagine the
differential treatment of provisional ballots in the context of a judicially-
supervised statewide recount. The significance of this point is that the
precedent of Bush v. Gore should apply just as much to this new provisional
ballot case as it did to the hanging chads in Florida-a proposition that
3 See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 699 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
4 Edward B. Foley, The Future of Bush v. Gore?, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 925, 932 (2007)
(emphasis added).
5 Id. A recent Yale Law Journal Comment, which suggests that the majority opinion
in Bush v. Gore attempted to nullify any precedential effect of its ruling, is an example of
the position with which both Lowenstein and I equally disagree. See Chad Flanders,
Comment, Bush v. Gore and the Uses of "Limiting", 116 YALE L.J. 1159 (2007).
6 Lowenstein, supra note 2, at 1020-2 1.
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Lowenstein wholeheartedly embraces. This example demonstrates that,
notwithstanding its limiting language, Bush v. Gore cannot be confined to
only its own facts (thereby confirming that, like Lowenstein, I do not accept
Bush v. Gore as unprincipled even if its holding is narrow in scope). 8
II. THE ADJUDICATION-REGULATION DISTINCTION
Lowenstein's key contribution, for which I am immensely grateful, is the
distinction between (1) adjudicatory-type actions in which similar evidence
relevant to the casting and counting of ballots is treated differently and (2)
regulatory-type actions that allocate electoral resources or opportunities
differently, but do not involve the differential treatment of similar pieces of
evidence in making specific determinations about whether particular
individuals will be permitted to cast a ballot that counts.
Lowenstein sees cases that fall within the first of these two categories as
presenting much stronger Equal Protection claims under Bush v. Gore than
those in the second category. So do I. As Lowenstein puts it, the differential
treatment of identical pieces of evidence in equivalent cases offends a
"natural" sense of justice. Focusing on this feature of Bush v. Gore accords
with the Due Process reading of the decision, as Lowenstein also observes,
and in my original article I elaborated the reasons for favoring this Due
Process reading.
Moreover, in acknowledging that the precedential force of Bush v. Gore
extends beyond its narrow holding, Lowenstein reasons that the same Due
Process principle would apply even where the differential treatment of
identical evidence occurs, not in the context of a court-supervised statewide
recount, but instead in the context of non-judicial adjudicatory proceedings.
Thus, for example, we can imagine a statewide recount conducted without
any judicial involvement pursuant to a statutory or regulatory directive, and
8 Neither Lowenstein nor I share Rick Hasen's intentionally provocative view that "a
little over six years later, Bush v. Gore is dead." Richard L. Hasen, The Untimely Death
of Bush v. Gore, 60 STAN. L. REv. (forthcoming Oct. 2007). Hasen himself recognizes
that this view is somewhat misleading and he would do "better to think of the case as
dormant as a constitutional precedent." Id. Citing my initial contribution to this
Symposium, Hasen also acknowledges that the Supreme Court might well find some
future Equal Protection claims meritorious based on the precedent of Bush v. Gore. But
Hasen is less interested than Lowenstein and I are in discerning the law of Bush v.
Gore-identifying in a principled way what claims should (and should not) be ruled
meritorious as a result of that precedent-and focuses instead on Bush v. Gore as a
potential catalyst of election law reform, whether instigated by courts or legislatures. On
that score, Hasen pronounces Bush v. Gore deceased. Although I am inclined to consider
this pronouncement premature (Congress, for example, is still considering various issues
of election law reform), it is beside the point with respect to the taxonomical project with
which Lowenstein and I are engaged.
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we can hypothesize that, as part of this purely administrative recount,
equivalent provisional ballots are treated differently (counted or rejected
depending solely on whether the provisional voter's original registration card
was examined, rather than relying solely on an examination of the state's
computerized registration database). Lowenstein views this hypothetical as
presenting a presumptively winning claim under Bush v. Gore because, as he
explains, an administrative recount is a "quasi-judicial" adjudicatory
proceeding, and, therefore, "[t]he analogical force of Bush v. Gore would be
strong in a case of this sort."9
Indeed, even if the differential treatment of identical evidence did not
occur within the very same statewide administrative recount, but instead
occurred in separate but equivalent administrative proceedings, Lowenstein
considers the same Due Process principle applicable. For example, suppose
that in one county within a state a valid driver's license without a current
address qualifies as acceptable voter identification, whereas in another
county it does not. We can imagine this differential treatment occurring in
the context of separate adjudicatory-type proceedings: when individuals with
these kinds of driver's licenses go to the polls, they are permitted to cast
regular (non-provisional) ballots--or not--depending on which county they
live in. "Because of the quasi-judicial nature of the[se] determinations ...
and the clear principle of natural justice that like cases should be treated
alike," Lowenstein explains, "the influence of Bush v. Gore in this situation
should be significant."'10
By contrast, when the exercise of administrative authority over elections
is not adjudicatory in nature, Bush v. Gore is further afield and thus has less
precedential force. Lowenstein cites the example of an election administrator
allocating a different number of voting machines to different precincts. I
agree, as I indicated in my original article, that this situation presents a
significantly weaker Equal Protection claim based on the authority of Bush v.
Gore.
In developing his alternative taxonomy, Lowenstein does not define this
category except in the negative: the absence of "quasi-judicial" decisions that
treat identical evidence differently. Building on Lowenstein's discussion, I
now suggest going one step further: to characterize this category as involving
administrative action of a regulatory rather than adjudicatory nature. The
regulatory-vs.-adjudicatory distinction may not always be clear-cut when
applied to some borderline situations, but it is a longstanding and serviceable
distinction in administrative law and, in the context of developing a
taxonomy of potential Bush v. Gore claims, it captures what is perhaps the
most salient feature of that precedent. Using the regulatory-vs.-adjudicatory
9 Lowenstein, supra note 2, at 1029.
10 Lowenstein, supra note 2, at 1030.
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terminology to describe this primary taxonomical dichotomy simply fine-
tunes what Lowenstein himself was getting at when he contrasted
"managerial" decisions with "quasi-judicial" ones.11 As Lowenstein himself
observed, Bush v. Gore is less relevant when administrative decisions about
elections are "managerial," or I would say "regulatory," in nature.12
III. THE LIMITATIONS OF LOWENSTEIN'S
CENTRAL-LOCAL DICHOTOMY
In offering his alternative taxonomy, Lowenstein would also draw a
sharp dichotomy between electoral inequalities caused directly by the
conduct of a single central administrative authority and electoral inequalities
that result from separate decisions of multiple decentralized authorities.
Lowenstein offers this sharp dichotomy in place of the four-part
classification of the relationship between central and local authorities that I
proposed in my original taxonomy.
As the reader may recall, I distinguished among the following situations:
(1) local authorities differ in their electoral practices as a result of
implementing an insufficiently precise directive from a central
authority;
(2) local authorities differ in their electoral practices because one or
more of them erroneously implements a directive from a central
authority, notwithstanding its sufficient precision;
(3) local authorities differ in their electoral practices because a
central authority has expressly and unequivocally given local
authorities permission to adopt divergent practices regarding the
particular matter;
(4) a central authority itself adopts a policy that imposes localized
electoral inequalities.
1 Lowenstein, supra note 2, at 1031-32.
12 The adjudication-regulation distinction also accords with a point that John Fortier
makes. He observes that, given the reasoning of Bush v. Gore, it is easier to prevail on an
Equal Protection claim in the context of a post-election recount than it is in a pre-election
challenge. See Fortier, supra note 1, at 1057. A post-election recount is, as we have
discussed, a form of adjudication, while a pre-election challenge is likely to concern
regulation. My agreement with Lowenstein that Bush v. Gore provides much more
support for an Equal Protection claim in an adjudicatory context than it does in a
regulatory context should also satisfy Fortier's concern that my initial taxonomy did not
do enough to limit the range of the precedent's potential applicability.
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Lowenstein's sharp dichotomy, in effect, would collapse the first three of
these four situations into a single category, doing away with the distinctions
between imprecision, mistake, and explicit authorization as the reason for
disparate treatment by local officials. Indeed, Lowenstein expressly
acknowledges that he would jettison these distinctions: "The question of why
the counties act differently from one another-because they interpret state
directives differently, or because the state directives leave the matter up to
the counties, or even because some counties disobey the state directives-is
irrelevant to [his alternative] proposed taxonomy."13
Unlike Lowenstein, I would retain these distinctions. He considers them
unimportant because he sees an imprecise directive from a central authority
as giving local officials implicit permission to vary in their practices, and he
further equates this implicit permission as functionally equivalent to explicit
permission. But I think there is an important distinction between implicit and
explicit permission, one which is potentially relevant to evaluating the merits
of future Bush v. Gore claims, and therefore one which should be salient in
developing the taxonomy of these claims.
When a central authority gives local officials explicit permission to adopt
different electoral practices, the central authority necessarily knows that
electoral inequalities will ensue if the local officials exercise this permission.
By contrast, where local disparities result from the implementation of an
insufficiently precise central directive, even if this imprecise directive can be
conceived as implicit permission to vary at the local level, it is not
necessarily true that the central authority expected this local variation to
occur. Instead, the central authority might not have realized the problem of
imprecision and, accordingly, might have expected uniform implementation
of the single central directive.
Lowenstein considers this expectation unlikely, but I think he is mistaken
in this respect. When a state statute says simply that local officials should
check "whether a provisional voter is registered," the legislature enacting the
statute does not anticipate that some local officials will check original
registration forms, while other local officials will examine only the
computerized registration database. Likewise, when a state statute instructs
local officials that among the various forms of acceptable voter identification
are "current utility bills," "a valid driver's license number," or "other
government identification," the legislature does not necessarily anticipate
that localities will vary in their interpretations of these statutory terms. In
neither of these real-world examples did the legislature think it was drafting
an imprecise statute, which would cause variation in local implementation.
Rather, in both cases, the imprecision-and ensuing variation-surfaced
once implementation was underway.
13 Lowenstein, supra note 2, at 1030.
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Moreover, it matters to Equal Protection analysis whether the electoral
inequality was anticipated or not. Under longstanding Equal Protection
doctrine, electoral inequalities require "strict scrutiny," or at least some form
of heightened judicial review, which is significantly more searching than the
easily surmounted "rational basis test." (As Lowenstein himself points out
for other purposes, this heightened judicial review occurs because of the
importance of voting, fundamental to the protection of all other rights and
interests.14) Heightened judicial review requires the government to
demonstrate a strong justification for the electoral inequalities it causes. The
government is more likely to be able to justify an electoral inequality that it
anticipated and yet nevertheless thought warranted. To be sure, just because
the government anticipates an electoral inequality, it does not follow that the
government will prevail under heightened judicial review. Nor will the
government necessarily fail this review in situations where it did not
anticipate the inequality; the government's reasons for doing what it did
might be sufficient, notwithstanding its unawareness of the electoral
inequality its actions would cause. Still, it is relevant to rigorous judicial
scrutiny whether the government was even aware of the electoral inequality
caused by its actions.
Indeed, the reasoning of Bush v. Gore itself supports this point. It was
evidently of concern to the Court that the inequality there was caused by an
imprecise standard that easily could have been avoided. The government is
much less likely to be able to justify its electoral inequality when it acts so
cavalierly. Thus, in developing a taxonomy of potential Bush v. Gore claims,
it is well worth distinguishing those situations in which the government's
conduct is thought out in advance from those circumstances in which the
government stumbles into a form of electoral discrimination that it did not
plan. Preserving the distinction between explicit permission for local
variation, on the one hand, from local variation resulting from imprecise
14 There has been considerable confusion and debate over what forms of relatively
innocuous electoral inequalities justify more lenient judicial review than "strict scrutiny"
and just how lenient this lower level of judicial scrutiny may be. Because Bush v. Gore
itself did not attempt to expressly calibrate the level of scrutiny it applied, but instead
went directly to a resolution of the merits, Bush v. Gore does not add much insight to the
calibration of judicial scrutiny levels in future voting administration cases. Nonetheless,
insofar as the taxonomy I have developed helps to distinguish stronger from weaker
Equal Protection claims based on the Bush v. Gore precedent, that taxonomy can be used
to address what scrutiny levels should be applied to various categories of these claims as
well as to resolve their ultimate merits. For a new and extremely useful analysis of the
level-of-scrutiny issue, see Christopher S. Elmendorf, Structuring Judicial Review of
Electoral Mechanics, Part I: Explanations and Opportunities, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
(forthcoming Dec. 2007).
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central directives, on the other, accords with this effort to be faithful to Bush
v. Gore.
One way to see this point is to imagine a case identical to Bush v. Gore
itself except that the local variation in the treatment of hanging chads results,
not from the imprecision of Florida's "intent of the voter" standard, but
instead from an explicit legislative delegation that "in any manual recount
involving ballots designed for the use of punch card machines, each county
shall adopt its own standard for determining which ballots contain legal votes
uncounted by those machines." As a result of this delegation, we can imagine
some counties willing to count dimpled chads, others insisting that chads be
punctured in order to count, and still others adopting the so-called "two-
corner rule," which requires that two corners of a chad be detached so that it
is truly "hanging" in order to count. It is quite possible that the Supreme
Court would find that these local differences in the counting of identical
chads violate Equal Protection, especially if they occurred in the context of a
judicially supervised statewide recount. Even so, all honest lawyers would
acknowledge that this variation-from-express-delegation case is not "on all
fours with" Bush v. Gore itself. Continuing to use Lowenstein's terminology,
the variation-from-express-delegation distinction takes this hypothetical
outside the narrow holding of Bush v. Gore and instead requires reliance on
its analogical force to assess whether the Equal Protection claim should be
ruled meritorious.
Moreover, identifying what would be the correct ruling on the merits of
this hypothetical is hardly a foregone conclusion. Presumably, the state
government would offer an argument along the following lines:
After extensive public deliberation, we chose to let localities adopt their
own standards for determining what sorts of chads should count as legal
votes. The reason we did so is that there are important regional differences
within our state concerning this issue. Some localities, with higher
proportions of elderly or less well-educated citizens, prefer a more lenient
standard that would be more likely to count a chad that is not machine-
readable. By contrast, other localities with younger or better-educated
residents tended to prefer a stricter standard, on the ground that voters
should be held more accountable for failing to dislodge chads as instructed.
We concluded that our state's electoral system ultimately would be more
democratic by honoring these local preferences.
It is by no means obvious that this argument would prevail. But
undoubtedly the Supreme Court would give it serious consideration to assess
whether it would be sufficient under heightened judicial review to justify the
electoral inequalities it causes. Just because this argument would involve a
thoroughly deliberated reason for the local variation, the Court would give it
more weight in its Equal Protection calculus than it did the local variation
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caused by the imprecise "intent of the voter" standard in Bush v. Gore itself.
Far from viewing the local variation in Bush v. Gore as a deliberate policy
choice, the Court there saw it simply as the unanticipated consequence of
failing to think through the implications when adopting the "intent of the
voter" standard without providing additional specific guidance.
The taxonomy of potential Equal Protection claims in the wake of Bush
v. Gore should reflect that this variation-from-express-delegation
hypothetical is a step removed from the holding of Bush v. Gore along one
factual dimension relevant to that holding. Lowenstein says it is important
that the taxonomy of potential future Bush v. Gore claims be structured to
recognize the significance of the adjudicatory context of the inequality there.
He is right. For the same reason, however, the taxonomy should also be
structured to distinguish adjudicatory rulings that implement an insufficiently
precise statewide standard, as Bush v. Gore itself did, from adjudicatory
rulings that implement an explicit delegation to local election authorities to
promulgate their own standards in accordance with local values. The
taxonomy should capture both dimensions of potential factual differences
relevant to the reasoning of Bush v. Gore.
Likewise, it is important to distinguish the variation-caused-by-mistake
scenario from variation-caused-by-imprecision. Local variation resulting
from local mistakes in implementing a statewide rule intended to be uniform
in implementation would seem a particularly unjustifiable form of inequality
and therefore most likely to fail heightened judicial scrutiny. Even so, as I
explained in my original article, this circumstance differs from the problem
of an insufficiently precise standard. A legislature cannot prevent mistakes
simply by instructing local officials not to make them. Rather, it is the very
nature of mistakes that they occur despite the legislative instructions
provided. A salient feature of Bush v. Gore itself, however, was that the
imprecision in the "intent of the voter" standard easily could have been
avoided by writing a more precise standard in advance.
Whether this factual distinction ultimately should make a difference in
the outcome of Equal Protection claims is a matter that the Court would need
to consider the first time it confronted a mistake-caused inequality that
arguably should be unconstitutional in light of Bush v. Gore. But the
taxonomy designed to prepare the Court, as well as lower courts and
litigators, for the permutations that might arise should at least flag this factual
distinction as worthy of consideration. Lowenstein's alternative taxonomy
does not. Nor does Lowenstein offer an explanation for omitting it.
Variation-caused-by-mistake cannot be viewed even as an implied delegation
in the way that variation-caused-by-imprecision can be.
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. IV. AN OUTLINE OF THE REFINED TAXONOMY
Thus, it is preferable to retain in the taxonomy the three-part distinction
between mistake, imprecision, and express delegation. Doing so, while
incorporating Lowenstein's valuable insights, enables us to present this
refined taxonomy:
1. adjudicatory-type action...
1.1. .... undertaken by local authorities based on...
1.1.1 ... mistaken implementation of clear central
directive
1.1.2. .. . variable implementation of imprecise central
directive
1.1.3. .. . exercise of explicit delegation from central
authority of power to set locally divergent standards
1.2. ... undertaken directly by central authority
2. regulatory-type action...
2.1 ... undertaken by local authorities based on...
2.1.1 ... mistaken implementation of clear central
directive
2.1.2 ... variable implementation of imprecise central
directive
2.1.3 ... exercise of explicit delegation from central
authority of power to set locally divergent standards
2.2 ... undertaken directly by central authority
Some of the categories created by this refined taxonomy are less likely to
occur than others. For example, it seems rather far-fetched that an
adjudicatory-type action undertaken by a central authority would
discriminate among voters based on locality. To be sure, we can
conceptualize the possibility that a state recount board would directly apply
one counting standard (whether concerning chads or provisional ballots or
voter ID) to ballots cast in some localities within the state while directly
applying a different counting standard to ballots cast in other localities. But
that scenario seems much less likely than the localities themselves diverging
in the counting standards that they apply, whether the divergence results
from mistake, imprecision, or express delegation.
Nonetheless, including this category (1.2) within the refined taxonomy
adds to our analytical understanding of potential Bush v. Gore claims-and
even of Bush v. Gore itself. Lowenstein would classify the facts of Bush v.
Gore as within this category. He characterizes the case as involving an
adjudicatory recount under the direct auspices of the Florida Supreme Court,
a single central authority. I still believe that Bush v. Gore is better viewed as
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a case involving adjudicatory-type actions undertaken by local authorities
based on variable implementation of an imprecise central directive (category
1.1.2 in the refined taxonomy).
In truth, the facts of Bush v. Gore are sufficiently messy and complicated
to permit classifying the case as within both these categories in the refined
taxonomy. Bush v. Gore is appropriately seen as an adjudication in which the
inequality is imposed directly by the central authority itself insofar as the
Florida Supreme Court itself treated some counties differently than others for
purposes of conducting the statewide recount. The willingness of the Florida
Supreme Court to include partial recounts from some counties, while
demanding full recounts from others, might be thought as a fact in the case
that especially supports Lowenstein's classification of it. Not surprisingly,
Lowenstein emphasizes this fact in his analytical account of the case.
Even so, the core of Bush v. Gore remains in my view the divergent
treatment of identical ballots by the local counties as a result of their efforts
to implement the imprecise statewide "intent of the voter" standard. The key
fact is that some counties applied a more lenient (dimpled chad) standard,
while other counties used a more rigorous (hanging chad) standard. I
consider this fact as presenting the core of the case because it is what the
U.S. Supreme Court itself focused on in saying what would be enough to
establish an Equal Protection violation. The Court explicitly stated that the
variation among counties, and even within counties, in the treatment of chads
was "not a process with sufficient guarantees of equal treatment" because it
lacked specification of the "intent of the voter" standard. 15 The Court also
expressly "conclude[d]" that this absent specification was "necessary" to
comply with Equal Protection. 16
Lowenstein glosses over these passages in the Court's opinion, finding
them unnecessary to consider in detail, but I think he is mistaken in this
regard. Whatever else may have been constitutionally problematic about the
Florida Supreme Court's decision (and I have already acknowledged these
other dubious aspects), it is appropriate to focus on the defect that the U.S.
Supreme Court isolates as enough to establish a constitutional violation. In
endeavoring to consider what other factual situations might also establish
Equal Protection violations, one can use the core constitutional deficiency in
Bush v. Gore as a baseline for comparative purposes. Therefore, it is useful
to classify the core facts of Bush v. Gore in category 1.1.2 of the refined
taxonomy, even if the facts in all their messy complexity can also be
classified appropriately in category 1.2.
Placing the core of Bush v. Gore in category 1.1.2 does not deny the fact
that even this core involved a recount supervised by the state's judiciary. The
15 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 107 (2000) (per curiam).
16 Id. at 106.
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requirement to implement the imprecise "intent of the voter" standard was
imposed by the Florida Supreme Court, after all, as the U.S. Supreme Court
expressly observes. Still, the unconstitutional variation in the implementation
of this imprecise standard occurred at the county level, not at the hands of the
central Florida Supreme Court itself (or even the central trial court in the
statewide judicial contest proceedings). It would have been a different case
had the Florida Supreme Court ordered one county to use a lenient (dimpled
chad) standard to review its ballots while requiring a different county to use a
stricter (hanging chad) standard for ballots there. It matters whether the
electoral inequality is imposed directly by the central authority or instead
imposed by divergent local authorities implementing an imprecise central
directive. The refined taxonomy captures this significant distinction, just as it
does other important ones. 17
V. MISTAKE, IMPRECISION, AND EXPRESS DELEGATION: RELEVANT TO
BOTH ADJUDICATION AND REGULATION
The three-part distinction between mistake, imprecision, and explicit
delegation is also potentially relevant to regulatory-type actions undertaken
by local authorities. Consider these three hypotheticals:
Mistake (category 2.1.1). A state's legislature instructs all counties to
supply each precinct with a number of ballots equal to 110% of ballots cast
in the same precinct in the most recent quadrennial general election that
included the presidency. A particular county miscalculates this figure for a
particular precinct, supplying too few ballots, with the result that some
voters are turned away unable to vote.
17 This point also answers the critique Lowenstein makes of the distinction between
the third and fourth categories of my original taxonomy. At one point Lowenstein says
that there is no real difference between counties adopting different standards pursuant to
an express delegation from the state and counties imposing inequalities directly upon
more local precincts. Lowenstein claims that I am merely "covering up part of the
organization chart" because, for counties to act this way towards their precincts, they
must be delegated the authority to do so from the state. Lowenstein, supra note 2, at
1014. But the relevant conceptual distinction, as Lowenstein recognizes elsewhere, is
whether-in the relationship between a more central and more local authority-
inequality is caused by conduct of the more local or more central authority. The fact that
a county can serve either as the more local or more central authority, depending on
whether its relationship is with the state or with its own precincts, does not negate this
conceptual truth. Thus, a direct, county-imposed inequality on precincts is conceptually
equivalent to a direct, state-imposed inequality upon counties, as Lowenstein also
acknowledges. In addition, I am not sure why in part I of his piece Lowenstein levels this
criticism on the distinction between the third and fourth categories of my original
taxonomy when, in part III of his piece, he makes the central-local dichotomy a central
feature of his own taxonomy.
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Imprecision (category 2.1.2). A state's legislature instructs all counties to
supply each precinct with an "adequate" number of ballots, but provides no
further specificity on how to define adequacy in this regard. Some counties
use a more risk-averse approach than others to implement this directive
(requiring, say, 120% of benchmark prior turnout rather than 110%). As a
result, in an election with an unexpected record-breaking turnout, voters in
the more risk-averse counties were all able to cast ballots, while some
voters in other counties were turned away because of the local ballot
shortages there.
Explicit delegation (category 2.1.3). A state law provides that "each county,
in light of its budget and other local considerations, shall have the authority
to determine the number of ballots to supply to each of its precincts."
Counties differ in the standards they adopt pursuant to this delegation of
authority. As a result, in a high turnout election, some counties suffer ballot
shortages while others do not.
It would be possible to articulate an Equal Protection claim based on any
of these three hypotheticals, but the merits of the Equal Protection claim in
each may differ because of the circumstances in which the locality adopts the
practice that causes the inequality. As we saw in the context of adjudicatory-
type actions, the strength of the government's justification for the inequality
it causes differs depending upon whether the inequality emanates from
mistake, imprecision, or explicit delegation. This is true also in the context of
regulatory-type action undertaken by local election authorities. A local ballot
shortage caused by the locality's mistaken interpretation of a statewide
mandate would obviously be much less easy to justify than a local ballot
shortage caused by a deliberate, budget-cutting decision pursuant to express
legislative authority to make this local policy choice. In any event, the nature
of the local decision in relation to state law would undoubtedly be a factor in
Equal Protection analysis, and, thus (as in the adjudicatory context), the
three-part distinction deserves inclusion in the taxonomy of potential Equal
Protection claims.
Moreover, the middle of these hypotheticals is the closest of the three to
the core of Bush v. Gore and thus is the one in which the analogical force of
that precedent is the strongest. Obviously, because this middle hypothetical
involves regulatory-type rather than adjudicatory-type action, the analogical
force is not as strong and indeed may not be strong enough to establish a
meritorious Equal Protection claim. Even so, it makes a difference that the
ballot shortage in some counties, but not others, results from differential
implementation of the imprecise statewide directive to supply precincts with
an "adequate" number of ballots. Here is a situation, as in Bush v. Gore itself,
where the unequal treatment of voters (in this case causing the outright
disenfranchisement of some) could have easily been avoided by a more
precise statewide directive.
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Lowenstein argues that in any case involving separate regulatory-type
action by local election authorities, the precedent of Bush v. Gore adds
nothing to the Equal Protection principles already articulated in Reynolds v.
Sims 18 and Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,19 the two Warren Court
cases upon which Bush v. Gore itself relies. But Lowenstein is incorrect in
this respect. In the middle regulatory-type hypothetical, the precedent of
Bush v. Gore does add force not supplied by the old Warren Court cases.
Because both Bush v. Gore and this middle hypothetical involve electoral
inequalities resulting from local implementation of insufficiently specific
statewide standards, a plaintiff here could rely on Bush v. Gore to make a
more persuasive claim than relying on the Warren Court precedents without
the additional benefit of Bush v. Gore.
Of course, if, before such a case arises, the U.S. Supreme Court confines
the precedent of Bush v. Gore exclusively to adjudicatory-type cases
(reasoning that this precedent is rooted in Due Process as much as Equal
Protection), then Bush v. Gore henceforth would add nothing to any
regulatory-type case. But that confinement of the precedent has not yet
occurred. Until it does, it is appropriate for the taxonomy of potential Bush v.
Gore claims to distinguish regulatory-type cases where localities endeavor to
implement an imprecise central directive, to indicate the currently greater
analogical force of that precedent in this particular context.
VI. CONCLUSION
If towards the end of this Response I have belabored the differences
between Lowenstein's approach and mine, my defense is that academics tend
to do so rather than emphasizing the extent of their agreement. But I would
prefer to close by observing that much more unites than divides Lowenstein
and me in our analyses of Bush v. Gore and the cases that might follow in its
wake. We both think that, notwithstanding its limiting language, Bush v.
Gore contains a ruling capable of principled explication (and, indeed, was
intended by the Court to do so). We both agree that the adjudicatory context
of Bush v. Gore is a crucial factor in analyzing the potential merits of future
claims based on that precedent. We also both believe that a taxonomy of
these possible future claims should be structured to reflect the primacy of this
crucial factor, giving secondary consideration to whether the administration
action causing the allegedly unconstitutional inequality was local or central
in nature. We diverge on one modest (but not inconsequential) point: whether
locally caused inequalities should be further subdivided taxonomically
18 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
19 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
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depending on whether the relationship of local variability to central authority
was one of mistake, imprecision, or express delegation.
In sum, I present the refined taxonomy as outlined above, incorporating
Lowenstein's important contributions while retaining elements of my
original proposal that (I continue to believe) deserve inclusion. I have no
doubt that this taxonomy will require further refinement in years to come as
more actual cases are litigated, thereby bringing new and unanticipated facts
to bear on the analysis of potential Bush v. Gore claims. I hope that, when
this need occurs, future scholarship will be able to build on the exchange of
ideas between Lowenstein and me in this Symposium, just as we have built
on each other's work. In this spirit, I offer the above-outlined taxonomy as a
starting point from which to begin to judge the merits of these future Equal
Protection claims.

